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Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations

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  • Chang, Roberto

Abstract

The author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by J. Bulow and K. Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of, but is not identical to, its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9392/RR91-47.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 91-47.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:91-47

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research

Keywords: Economic information ; investments ; debt;

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Cited by:
  1. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  2. Mark L. J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
  3. Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2002. "Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 177-209, October.
  4. Mark L . J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Working Paper Series 2004-34, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  5. Chang, Roberto, 1998. "Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-255, April.

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