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Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées

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  • Mouez FODHA

    (ERASME et EUREQua, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Cet article analyse les politiques fiscales à mettre en œuvre afin de lutter contre une externalité de pollution. Nous considérons un modèle à générations imbriquées où seul l'Etat mène une activité de maintenance de l'environnement, financée par le prélèvement de taxes. L'équilibre concurrentiel est sous-optimal puisque l'économie est confrontée (i) à un problème de fourniture du bien public qu'est la maintenance, (ii) à une externalité de pollution induite par la consommation, (iii) à l'égoïsme des individus à courte durée de vie. Nous déterminons la structure fiscale telle que l'optimum et l'équilibre concurrentiel coïncident. Nous retrouvons alors la règle de Samuelson, modifiée afin d'intégrer un taux d'actualisation social pertinent, incorporant le taux d'assimilation naturelle de la pollution. Par ailleurs, l'intervention publique ne peut se limiter à neutraliser les flux de polluants : cette activité publique doit prendre en compte, outre une composante de dépollution, une composante optimale d'entretien.

Suggested Citation

  • Mouez FODHA, 2005. "Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2005044
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Taxe environnementale; modèle à générations imbriquées; règle d’or modifiée;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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