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Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games: The Main Ideas

Author

Listed:
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984, Pearce, 1984) on its own fails to exclude some very implausible strategy choices. Three main refinements of rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect, and proper rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of these refinements also fail to eliminate unreasonable outcomes and suffer from some drawbacks. Therefore, we introduce the trembling-hand rationalizability concept, where the players' actions have to be best responses also against perturbed conjectures. We also propose another refinement: "epsilon"-perfect rationalizability; and we show that every proper rationalizable strategy profile is also "epsilon"-perfect rationalizable. The differences between the various refinements are illustrated by means of examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games: The Main Ideas," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1996012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1996012
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rationalizability; refinements; normal-form games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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