Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Relationship Between Union Wage Claims and the Constituents of Firm's Rents : A Theoretical Appraisal

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bughin, Jacques

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The paper uses the recent union-firm bargaining literature for a theoretical appraisal of the positive relationship found in some empirical studies between union wages and the constituents of firm’s monopolistic rents. The paper assesses that this relationship depends on many factors, such as : - Whether unions have a say on the use of labor (which conditions the possibility that unions may directly capture firm’s rents) - The timing of firm’s decision, that is, on whether wage bargaining takes place before or after other firm’s inputs decisions (because firm threat-point depends on the fixity or the flexibility of its inputs). – the nature of the firm’s technology (because union’s labor share depends on the elasticities of substitution between inputs, and of output with respect of the labor) ;- the definition of the firm’s threat-point (because the higher the firm’s threat-point, the lower the surplus to be shared between the firm and the union). The paper further concludes that a proper empirical appraisal of the relationship between wages and (the determinants of) firm’s rents should include a set of control variables, and a serie of cross effects between those variables and (the determinants of) firm’s rents.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 1992013.

    as in new window
    Length: 24
    Date of creation: 01 Jan 1992
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992013

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
    Fax: +32 10473945
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: wages; enterprises;

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Bughin, Jacques & Vannini, Stefano, 1995. "Strategic direct investment under unionized oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 127-145, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.