On Gale and Shapley ‘College admissions and stability of marriage’
AbstractIn this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena affecting the composition of the marriage market.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2008046.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Matching; stability; marriage model; divorce cascades;
Other versions of this item:
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & GARCIA, Filomena & PAIS, Joana & RESENDE, Joana, 2008. "On Gale and Shapley ‘College admissions and stability of marriage’," CORE Discussion Papers 2008067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
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