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Tax interaction dynamics among Belgian municipalities, 1984-1997

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Author Info
Jean-Franois, RICHARD
Henry, TULKENS
Magali, Verdonck

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to test econometrically the existence of fiscal interactions between Belgian municipalities. At the time of writing, the motivation was to provide scientific support to the lively debate on fiscal competition that took place among Belgian politicians in the late nineties. Two types of taxes are considered, for which Belgian municipalities have the decision power as to rates : the Òcentimes additionnelsÓ on the personal income tax and the ÒprŽcompte immobilierÓ which is a property tax. A dynamic adjustment model is specified and estimated using panel data for 598 municipalities over 15 years. The empirical results obtained bear upon two main points : (i) Some interaction definitely has prevailed between the municipalitiesÕ fiscal choices made during the observation period, for both taxes; (ii) However, the adjustment reactions to the other municipalitiesÕ fiscal choices have occured over time at the very low yearly pace of 6% and 10% respectively, of the discrepancy between the actual rates and the preferred rates.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2005039.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005039

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  2. Nickell, Stephen, 1985. "Error Correction, Partial Adjustment and All That: An Expository Note," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 47(2), pages 119-29, May.
  3. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgaessner, Gebhard, 2000. "Income Tax Competition at the State and Local Level in Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ashworth, John & Heyndels, Bruno, 1997. "Politicians' preferences on local tax rates: An empirical analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 479-502, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brueckner, Jan K., 1998. "Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: The Case of Growth Controls," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 438-467, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Besley, Timothy J. & Rosen, Harvey S., 1998. "Vertical externalities in tax setting: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 383-398, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, 2001. "An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 481-503, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Davidson, James E H, et al, 1978. "Econometric Modelling of the Aggregate Time-Series Relationship between Consumers' Expenditure and Income in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 88(352), pages 661-92, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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