An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
AbstractWe analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we1107.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Lotteries; Public good; Warm glow; Efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- Cabrales, Antonio & Lugo, Haydée, 2011. "An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Antonio Cabrales & Haydée Lugo, 2011. "An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias EconÃ³micas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de AnÃ¡lisis EconÃ³mico 2011-05, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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