Do Internal Auditors Observe How Trust Behavior Reduces Budgetary Slack?

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Do Internal Auditors Observe How Trust Behavior Reduces Budgetary Slack?

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Waymond Rodgers ()
Susana Gago ()
Mercedes Barrachina Palanca ()

Abstract

Trust among executives and managers may reduce budgetary slack due to decreased inefficiencies. Trust relationships are studied as a prerequisite to influence budget setting. One hundred and twenty internal auditors observed different relations between the executive and managers. Results demonstrated that trust environments can reduce budgetary slack. Internal auditors are able to provide better services when “trust issues” between middle and top managers are recognized and incorporated as part of their investigated procedures.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa in its series Business Economics Working Papers with number wb064415.

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Date of creation: Jul 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb064415

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ACC-2006-07-28 (Accounting & Auditing)
NEP-ALL-2006-07-28 (All new papers)
NEP-SOC-2006-07-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

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