Drawing on stakeholder-agency theory and the earnings management framework, we explore the relationship between discretionary accounting accruals and corporate social responsibility. We hypothesize a positive connection between corporate social responsibility and earnings management. We argue that managers may satisfy the interest of stakeholders as an entrenchment strategy once these managers have followed earnings management practices, thereby damaging the long-term interests of shareholders. Also, we expect that the positive connection between corporate social responsibility and financial performance is negatively moderated when combined with earnings management practices. We empirically demonstrate our theoretical contention making use of a database comprising of 599 firms from 32 different nations for the period 2002-2004.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa in its series Business Economics Working Papers with number
wb062306.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jean Tirole, 2000.
"Corporate Governance,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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