Was The Argentine Corralito An Efficient Measure?: A Note
AbstractTheoretical banking literature has largely explored the role of financial intermediaries in the economy, market failures (banking panics) in the banking sector and the need for bank regulation. However, most models of banking panics and regulation have not been empirically tested. The Argentine 2001 crisis, with a large deposit withdrawal and the regulation introduced (suspension of convertibility) constitutes a scenario in order to apply some of the theoretical predictions. In particular, the paper applies Samartín (2002) to the particular case of Argentina. After the estimation of the most important parameters, the model predicts that suspension of convertibility seems to have been the most efficient intervention measure to stop the massive deposit withdrawals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa in its series Business Economics Working Papers with number wb042209.
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
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