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Lessons For An Aging Society: The Political Sustainability Of Social Security Systems

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Author Info
Vincenzo Galasso () (Center for Retirement Research at Boston)
Paola Profeta

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Abstract

What is the future of social security systems in OECD countries? In our view, the answer belongs to the realm of politics. We evaluate how political constraints shape the social security system in six countries -- France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US -- under population aging. Two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the analysis. First, the increase in the dependency ratio -- the ratio of retirees to workers -- reduces the average profitability of the unfunded social security system, thereby inducing the agents to reduce the size of the system by substituting their claims towards future pensions with more private savings. Second, an aging electorate leads to larger systems, since it increases the relevance of pension spending on the policy-makers' agenda. The overall assessment from our simulations is that the political aspect dominates in all countries, albeit with some differences. Spain, the fastest aging country, faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate. When labor market considerations are introduced, the political effect still dominates, but it is less sizeable. Country specific characteristics (not accounted for in our simulations), such as the degree of redistribution in the pension system and the existence of family ties in the society, may also matter. Our simulations deliver a strong policy implication: an increase in the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters, while often increasing its generosity. Finally, delegation of pension policy to the EC may reduce political accountability and hence help to reform the systems.

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Paper provided by Center for Retirement Research in its series Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College with number 2004-07.

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Date of creation: 24 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:crr:crrwps:2004-07

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Reforming our pension system: Is it a demographic, financial or political problem?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 974-983, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tito Boeri & Axel Boersch-Supan & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Pension Reforms and the Opinions of European Citizens," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 396-401, May. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2002. "The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement," IDEI Working Papers 144, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  5. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso, . "The Macroeconomics of Early Retirement," Working Papers 2003-05, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Vincenzo Galasso, 1999. "The US Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(3), pages 698-730, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Marco Manacorda & Enrico Moretti, 2002. "Intergenerational Transfers and Household Structure. Why Do Most Italian Youths Live With Their Parents?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0536, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  12. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Thomas Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "Privatizing Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(3), pages 731-755, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Agar Brugiavini & Vincenzo Galasso, 2003. "The Social Security Reform Process in Italy: Where do We Stand?," Working Papers wp052, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2008. "Aging, Inequality and Social Security," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-19, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilles Le Garrec, 2005. "Systèmes de retraite et vieillissement," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2005-21, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  4. Paola Profeta, 2008. "Political Support and Tax Reforms: An Italian Example," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(1), pages 32-36, 04. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matteo Bassi, 2008. "An Egg Today and a Chicken Tomorrow: A Model of Social Security with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting," CSEF Working Papers 205, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2006. "Early Retirement and Social Security: A Long Term Perspective," CSEF Working Papers 165, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Marko Köthenbürger & Panu Poutvaara & Paola Profeta, 2005. "Why are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Working Papers 2007-07, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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