I sistemi elettorali e la politica fiscale: il caso italiano dal 1861 ai giorni nostri
AbstractThis paper aims to the analysis of the rules electoral effects on fiscal policy, respect to the Italian case: in fact Italy, since 1861 until nowadays, modified several times its electoral system, switching from the majoritarian to the proportional system. In particular here we focus on the effects of different electoral systems on the “size” of the government, measured in terms of public expenditure, taxation and public deficit, and the “composition” of the government, measured in terms of redistributive expenditure. Differently from other empirical works, focussing on the effects of different political systems on several countries, i.e. a cross-sections analysis, this paper concerns a single country, Italy, according to a time-series perspective, 140 years. In this empirical analysis we confirm previous results of the literature: in general majoritarian electoral systems devote less financial resources either to the size and to the composition of the government respect to the proportional systems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC) in its series CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale with number crn0801.
Date of creation: 2008
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electoral system; fiscal policy; GDP; trade; public debt;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
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