Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Designing Governance Mechanisms for Knowledge-Intensive

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alfonso Gambardella

    () (KITES Bocconi University, Milan, Italy)

  • Claudio Panico

    () (KITES Bocconi University, Milan, Italy)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Knowledge-intensive activities are bound by imperfections that limit the provision of incentives, particularly asymmetric information about inputs and unclear definition of outputs. Thus, performance-based incentives are not possible. We then model a contract in which the firm can use the delegation of decision rights to provide incentives. The main argument is that a fine-tuned allocation of decision rights reduces the information rents of a knowledge provider by offsetting her strategic use of the information advantage. We show that when the firm owns strong complementary assets to leverage the provider's knowledge, the delegation of decision rights can fully resolve the limitations due to asymmetric information. When this condition is not met, the provider is offered full autonomy, but it is optimal for the firm to let the most knowledgeable providers go. We also discuss the generality of our approach.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: ftp://ftp.unibocconi.it/pub/RePEc/cri/papers/KitesWP19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series KITeS Working Papers with number 019.

    as in new window
    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: May 2009
    Date of revision: May 2009
    Handle: RePEc:cri:cespri:kites19_wp

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano - Italy
    Phone: +39.025836.3397
    Fax: +39.025836.3399
    Web page: http://www.kites.unibocconi.it/

    Order Information:
    Postal: E G E A - via R. Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano -Italy

    Related research

    Keywords: Knowledge; Research; Spinoffs; Governance; Contracts; Adverse Selection;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Gilles Chemla, 2008. "Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(3), pages 505-521, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cri:cespri:kites19_wp

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valerio Sterzi).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.