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Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games

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Author Info
Gwenaël Piaser () (Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg)
Abstract

It is argued that the revelation principle in multi-principal multi-agent games cannot be generalized. In other words, one cannot restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms, even if the concept of information is enlarged.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg in its series Working Papers of CREFI-LSF (Centre of Research in Finance - Luxembourg School of Finance) with number 08-02.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:crf:wpaper:08-02

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Related research
Keywords: Direct Mechanims; Incentive compatible; Multiprincipals.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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