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Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments

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Author Info
Marcel Boyer (Université de Montréal and CIRANO)
Pierre Lasserre () (Economics Department, UQAM, GREQAM and CIRANO)
Thomas Mariotti (GREMAQ and Université de Toulouse I)
Michel Moreaux (Institut Universitaire de France, Université de Toulouse I, IDEI and LEERNA)

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Abstract

We study the development of a duopoly industry - evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior - in a continuous-time real-options model of capacity investment. Our methodology allows the evaluation of investment options and exercise rules in a strategic setup. In the initial industry development phase, firms attempt to preempt each other, so that the first industry investment occurs earlier than socially optimal and the first entrant takes more risk than socially optimal. While capacity units are costly, indivisible, durable, and big relative to market size, early entry cannot secure a first-mover advantage, so that both firms are active beyond some level of market development. Once both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion, taking the form of postponed capacity investment, may occur in Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Volatility and the expected speed of market development play a crucial role in the determination of competitive behavior: we show that a tacit-collusion equilibrium is certain to exist when market growth is highly volatile and/or very fast.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 20-10.

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Length: 43
Date of creation: Oct 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:20-10

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Related research
Keywords: Real options Option value Duopoly Preemption Collusion Capacity Industry growth Volatility Risk - Options réelles Valeur d'option Duopole Préemption Collusion Capacité Croissance du marché Volatilité Risque.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard J. Gilbert & Richard G. Harris, 1984. "Competition with Lumpy Investment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 197-212, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Grenadier, Steven R, 1996. " The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1653-79, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Weeds, Helen, 2002. "Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(3), pages 729-47, July.
    Other versions:
  5. Harris, Christopher J & Vickers, John S, 1985. "Patent Races and the Persistence of Monopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 461-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. DÉCAMPS, Jean-Paul & MARIOTTI, Thomas, 2000. "Irreversible Investment and Learning Externalities," IDEI Working Papers 97, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. David E. Mills, 1988. "Preemptive Investment Timing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 114-122, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dasgupta, P. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1988. "Potential competition, actual competition, and economic welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 569-577, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Athey, Susan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2001. "Investment and Market Dominance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  11. Leahy, John V, 1993. "Investment in Competitive Equilibrium: The Optimality of Myopic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 1105-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. J.J.J. Thijssen & K.J.M. Huisman & P.M. Kort, 2003. "The Effects of Information on Strategic Investment and Welfare," Trinity Economics Papers 200310, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1379, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Thijssen, J.J.J. & Huisman, K.J.M. & Kort, P.M., 2002. "Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretical real option models," Discussion Paper 81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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