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Quality Undersupply and Oversupply

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Author Info
Max Blouin () (Center for Research on Economic Fluctuations and Employment, UQAM)

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Abstract

I analyze a market in which a price-taking buyer buys a variable-quality good from a population of sellers, contrasting the case where quality is a seller's private information to that where it is public information. Average quality traded under private information can be either higher (quality oversupply) or lower (quality undersupply) than under public information, depending on sellers' preferences. We are likely to see quality undersupply if (i) sellers' preferences exhibit substitutability between the variable-quality good and the numéraire good, and/or (ii) sellers view the numéraire good as a luxury good relative to the variable-quality good. Reverse arguments hold for quality oversupply.

J'analyse un marché dans lequel un acheteur achète un bien de qualité variable d'une population de vendeurs. Je compare deux cas, celui où la qualité est connue des vendeurs seulement (information privée) et celui où la qualité est connue publiquement (information publique). La qualité moyenne vendue sur le marché avec information privée peut être supérieure ou inférieure à la qualité moyenne vendue sur le marché avec information publique, selon les préférences des vendeurs. Elle aura tendance à être supérieure si (i) les préférences des vendeurs manifestent une substituabilité entre le bien à qualité variable et le bien numéraire, et/ou (ii) les vendeurs considèrent le bien numéraire comme un bien de luxe par rapport au bien à qualité variable.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 113.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:113

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Related research
Keywords: adverse selection; income effect; substitution effect;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1985. "The Market for "Lemons" Reconsidered: A Model of the Used Car Market with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 836-43, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hahn, Frank, 1978. "On Non-Walrasian Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 1-17, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wilson, Charles A, 1979. "Equilibrium and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 313-17, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gale, Douglas, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 207-35, February.
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  6. Gale, Douglas, 1992. "A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(2), pages 229-55, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  10. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1097-1115, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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