Child Labor and Coordination Failures
AbstractIn this paper, we show how coordination failures may explain the prevalence of child labor in developing countries. We do so within a simple game-theoretic setup. Child labor arises in our environment because of the lack of a coordination mechanism between parental decisions to invest in the human capital of their children and firm's decisions to invest in skill-intensive technology. Governmental policies that help coordinate expectations lead to the disappearance of child labor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 109.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: published (latest version) in Journal of Development Economics, 65/2, June 2001, 469-476
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Child labor; welfare; equilibrium selection; coordination;
Other versions of this item:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-04-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2000-04-04 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-EDU-2000-04-04 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2000-04-04 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2000-04-04 (Public Economics)
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