Voters elect politicians who closely matched their preferences
AbstractWhat determines political candidates? election prospects? We match roll call votes of candidates for the majority elected upper house of parliament who were previously in the lower house with revealed preferences of their constituency. Thereby, we obtain a direct measure of past congruence. Politicians have a significantly and quantitatively important higher probability of election when they more closely matched the preferences of their constituency. This pr ovides evidence for the direct retrospective voting rule that voters elect politicians who represented their preferences well.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2012-10.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Retrospective Voting; Voting Behavior; Representation; Constituents? Preferences;
Other versions of this item:
- David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "Voters elect politicians who closely matched their preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1001-1009.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-07-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-29 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna-Lea Werlen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.