Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations
AbstractIn the course of history a large number of politicians has been assassinated. A rational choice analysis is used to distinguish the expected marginal benefits of killing, and the marginal cost of attacking a politician. The comparative analysis of various equilibria helps us to gain insights into specific historical events. The analysis suggests that ? in addition to well-known security measures ? an extension of democracy, a rule by a committee of several politicians, more decentralization via the division of power and federalism, and a strengthening of civil society significantly reduce politicians? probability of being attacked and killed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2007-08.
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Rational choice; democracy; dictatorship; assassination; deterrence;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations," IEW - Working Papers 324, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-06-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HIS-2007-06-11 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-11 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-06-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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