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Bank Loan Maturity and Priority when Borrowers can Refinance Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Douglas W Diamond
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This paper describes a theory of how borrowers with private information about their future credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of bank loans and publicly issued bonds. The model implies that short-term bank loans will be senior to public long- term debt. With sufficient public debt, banks will not make concessions when restructuring their debt in response to a borrower's financial distress. Recent evidence on the debt restructuring activities of banks is interpreted in the context of the model.
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Paper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number
0022.
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Date of creation: Oct 1992Date of revision:
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0022Contact details of provider: Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
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Keywords: Debt Maturity ; Priority ; Bank Loan ; Seniority ; Other versions of this item:
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Tirole, Jean, 2008.
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