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Financial Intermediation with Proprietary Information

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  • Sudipto Bhattacharya

Abstract

I contrast equilibria in loan markets under bilateral bank- borrower relationships, in which proprietary technological knowledge of borrowers is not revealed to product-market competitors, with equilibria under multilateral financing which may lead to such knowledge being shared across product-market competitors. I examine the conditions for equilibrium existence, ex ante efficiency, and incentives to undertake privately-financed, costly knowledge-generating R&D, under these two differing institutional mechanisms for financing R&D-intensive investments by firms competing in product markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number 0021.

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Date of creation: Oct 1992
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Availability: in print
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0021

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Keywords: Intermediation; Proprietary Knowledge; Disclosure;

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Cited by:
  1. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0510001, EconWPA.
  2. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjolein Schmeits, 1996. "Market Discipline in Conglomerate Banks: Is an Internal Allocation of Cost of Capital Necessary as an Incentive Device?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-39, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  3. Caminal, Ramon, 1997. "Financial intermediation and the optimal tax system," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 351-382, February.
  4. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0510003, EconWPA.

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