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A bargaining theory of trade invoicing and pricing

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  • Goldberg, Linda S.
  • Tille, Cédric

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model of international trade pricing in which individual exporters and importers bargain over the transaction price and exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. We find that the choice of price and invoicing currency reflects the full market structure, including the extent of fragmentation and the degree of heterogeneity across importers and across exporters. Our study shows that a party has a higher effective bargaining weight when it is large or more risk tolerant. A higher effective bargaining weight of importers relative to exporters in turn translates into lower import prices and greater exchange rate pass-through into import prices. We show the range of price and invoicing outcomes that arise under alternative market structures. Such structures matter not only for the outcome of specific exporter-importer transactions, but also for aggregate variables such as the average price, the average choice of invoicing currency, and the correlation between invoicing currency and the size of trade transactions.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9447.

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Date of creation: Apr 2013
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9447

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Keywords: currency invoicing; exchange rate;

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References

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  1. Cedric Tille & Eric van Wincoop, 2007. "International Capital Flows," Working Papers 122007, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  2. Philippe Bacchetta & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "A Theory of the Currency Denomination of International Trade," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 01.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
  4. Michael B. Devereux & Charles Engel & Peter E. Storgaard, 2003. "Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through when Nominal Prices are Set in Advance," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0304, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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  6. Hellerstein, Rebecca, 2008. "Who bears the cost of a change in the exchange rate? Pass-through accounting for the case of beer," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 14-32, September.
  7. Hans Normann, Bradley Ruffle and Christopher Snyder, 2004. "Do Buyer-Size Discounts Depend on the Curvature of the Surplus Function? Experimental Tests of Bargaining Models," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/01, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004.
  8. Linda S. Goldberg & Cedric Tille, 2005. "Vehicle Currency Use in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 11127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Selcuk, Cemil, 2012. "Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 207-210.
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    • Michael B. Devereux & Shouyong Shi, 2013. "Vehicle Currency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 97-133, 02.
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  13. Friberg, Richard, 1998. "In which currency should exporters set their prices?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 59-76, June.
  14. Raphael S. Schoenle & Raphael A. Auer, 2013. "Market Structure and Exchange Rate Pass-Through," Working Papers 62, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
  15. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March.
  16. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. " Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  17. Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil, 2004. "Price Dispersion with Directed Search," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1173, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  18. Novy, Dennis, 2006. "Hedge Your Costs: Exchange Rate Risk and Endogenous Currency Invoicing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 765, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  19. Tasneem Chipty & Christopher M. Snyder, 1999. "The Role Of Firm Size In Bilateral Bargaining: A Study Of The Cable Television Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 326-340, May.
  20. Charles Engel, 2005. "Equivalence Results for Optimal Pass-Through, Optimal Indexing to Exchange Rates, and Optimal Choice of Currency for Export Pricing," NBER Working Papers 11209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Bargaining power and international pricing
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-06-06 14:27:00
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Cited by:
  1. Eichengreen, Barry & Chiţu, Livia & Mehl, Arnaud, 2014. "Network effects, homogeneous goods and international currency choice: new evidence on oil markets from an older era," Working Paper Series 1651, European Central Bank.

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