IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/9389.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Violante, Giovanni
  • Pavoni, Nicola
  • Setty, Ofer

Abstract

Some existing welfare programs (?work-first?) require participants to work in exchange for benefits. Others (?job search-first?) emphasize private job-search and provide assistance in finding and retaining a durable employment. This paper studies the optimal design of welfare programs when (i) the principal/government is unable to observe the agent?s effort, but can assist the agent?s job search and can mandate the agent to work, and (ii) agents? skills depreciate during unemployment. In the optimal welfare program, assisted search is implemented between an initial spell of private search (unemployment insurance) and a final spell of pure income support where search effort is not elicited. To be effective, job-search assistance requires large reemployment subsidies. The optimal program features compulsory work activities for low levels of program?s generosity (i.e., its promised utility or available budget). The threat of mandatory work acts like a punishment that facilitates the provision of search incentives without compromising consumption smoothing too much.

Suggested Citation

  • Violante, Giovanni & Pavoni, Nicola & Setty, Ofer, 2013. "Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 9389, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9389
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP9389
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christopher Phelan & Robert M. Townsend, 1991. "Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(5), pages 853-881.
    2. Krueger, Alan B. & Mueller, Andreas, 2010. "Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from time use data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 298-307, April.
    3. Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2008. "Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1922-1942, December.
    4. Robert A. Moffitt, 2003. "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program," NBER Chapters, in: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, pages 291-364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
    6. Machin, Stephen & Manning, Alan, 1999. "The causes and consequences of longterm unemployment in Europe," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 3085-3139, Elsevier.
    7. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1998. "The European Unemployment Dilemma," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 514-550, June.
    8. Orazio Attanasio & Hamish Low & Virginia Sánchez-Marcos, 2008. "Explaining Changes in Female Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1517-1552, September.
    9. Mueller, Andreas, 2010. "On-the-job search and wage dispersion: New evidence from time use data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 124-127, November.
    10. Addison, John T & Portugal, Pedro, 1989. "Job Displacement, Relative Wage Changes, and Duration of Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 281-302, July.
    11. Neal, Derek, 1995. "Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 653-677, October.
    12. repec:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:91-92:p:17 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Bruce C. Fallick, 1996. "A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 5-16, October.
    14. repec:mpr:mprres:3224 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Annette Bergemann & Gerard J. Van Den Berg, 2008. "Active Labor Market Policy Effects for Women in Europe - A Survey," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 91-92, pages 385-408.
    16. Zvi Eckstein & Kenneth I. Wolpin, 1989. "Dynamic Labour Force Participation of Married Women and Endogenous Work Experience," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 375-390.
    17. Ofer Setty, 2019. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), pages 693-733, May.
    18. repec:mpr:mprres:2922 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Nicola Pavoni, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance, With Human Capital Depreciation, And Duration Dependence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 323-362, May.
    20. Steven J. Davis & Till Von Wachter, 2011. "Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 42(2 (Fall)), pages 1-72.
    21. Christopher J. Flinn, 1986. "Econometric Analysis of CPS-Type Unemployment Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 21(4), pages 456-484.
    22. Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
    23. Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097, Elsevier.
    24. Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 2001. "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1491-1518, November.
    25. Pavoni, Nicola, 2007. "On optimal unemployment compensation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 1612-1630, September.
    26. Moffitt, Robert, 2008. "Welfare reform: the US experience," Working Paper Series 2008:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    27. Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2013. "Training and search during unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 49-65.
    28. repec:mpr:mprres:3230 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    30. Keane, Michael P & Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1997. "The Career Decisions of Young Men," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 473-522, June.
    31. Ashenfelter, Orley & Ashmore, David & Deschenes, Olivier, 2005. "Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? Evidence from randomized trials in four U.S. States," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 53-75.
    32. Jerry A. Hausman, 1980. "The Effect of Wages, Taxes, and Fixed Costs on Women's Labor Force Participation," NBER Chapters, in: Econometric Studies in Public Finance, pages 161-194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    34. Bruce D. Meyer, 1995. "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 91-131, March.
    35. Cogan, John F, 1981. "Fixed Costs and Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 945-963, June.
    36. Conny Wunsch, 2013. "Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 1030-1045, July.
    37. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1990. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    38. Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Juan Pablo Nicolini, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 1049-1070.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dominik Sachs & Sebastian Findeisen, 2016. "Optimal Financial Aid Policies for Students," 2016 Meeting Papers 1421, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Setty, Ofer, 2011. "Unemployment Accounts," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275748, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Claudio Michelacci & Hernán Ruffo, 2015. "Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 816-859, February.
    4. Sebastian Koehne & Moritz Kuhn, 2015. "Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(3), pages 575-592, July.
    5. Ortego-Marti, Victor, 2017. "Loss of skill during unemployment and TFP differences across countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 215-235.
    6. Ortego-Marti, Victor, 2017. "The Cyclical Behavior Of Unemployment And Vacancies With Loss Of Skills During Unemployment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 1277-1304, September.
    7. Patrick Arni & Gerard J. van den Berg & Rafael Lalive, 2022. "Treatment Versus Regime Effects of Carrots and Sticks," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 111-127, January.
    8. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June.
    9. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2015. "Designing efficient college and tax policies," Working Papers 15-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    10. Nicholas Lawson, 2023. "Optimal unemployment policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 675-692, July.
    11. Sergio Cappellini, 2022. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Worker Profiling," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0294, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    12. Nicola Pavoni & Ofer Setty & Giovanni Violante, 2016. "The design of 'soft' welfare-to-work programs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 20, pages 160-180, April.
    13. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2013. "The Causal Effect of Unemployment Duration on Wages: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance Extensions," NBER Working Papers 19772, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
    2. Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2013. "Training and search during unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 49-65.
    3. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
    4. Sergio Cappellini, 2022. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Worker Profiling," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0294, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    5. Nicola Pavoni & Ofer Setty & Giovanni Violante, 2016. "The design of 'soft' welfare-to-work programs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 20, pages 160-180, April.
    6. Ortego-Marti, Victor, 2017. "Loss of skill during unemployment and TFP differences across countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 215-235.
    7. Hairault, Jean-Olivier & Langot, François & Ménard, Sébastien & Sopraseuth, Thepthida, 2012. "Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 509-519.
    8. Tom Krebs & Martin Scheffel, 2016. "Labor Market Institutions and the Cost of Recessions," CESifo Working Paper Series 6262, CESifo.
    9. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    10. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2017. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini 's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," TEPP Working Paper 2017-08, TEPP.
    11. Tobias Laun, 2020. "Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 464-493, April.
    12. Ofer Setty, 2019. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), pages 693-733, May.
    13. Kam, Timothy & Stauber, Ronald, 2016. "Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: Theory and computational approximation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 77-98.
    14. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
    15. Jun Nie, 2010. "Training or search? evidence and an equilibrium model," Research Working Paper RWP 10-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    16. Conny Wunsch, 2013. "Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 1030-1045, July.
    17. Stefanie Behncke & Markus Frölich & Michael Lechner, 2010. "Unemployed and their caseworkers: should they be friends or foes?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 173(1), pages 67-92, January.
    18. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2013. "The Causal Effect of Unemployment Duration on Wages: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance Extensions," NBER Working Papers 19772, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Hagedorn, Marcus & Kaul, Ashok & Mennel, Tim, 2010. "An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 490-502, March.
    20. Etienne Lalé, 2018. "Turbulence and the employment experience of older workers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), pages 735-784, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Recursive contracts; Search; Welfare program; Work;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9389. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.