Economic Science and Political Influence
AbstractWhen policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9263.
Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Gilles Saint-Paul, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," PSE Working Papers halshs-00759057, HAL.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 7120, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," TSE Working Papers 12-365, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2013-01-07 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2013-01-07 (Sociology of Economics)
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