A Macroeconomic Model of Endogenous Systemic Risk Taking
AbstractWe analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model. Banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms. Banks are owned by risk-neutral bankers who provide the equity needed to comply with capital requirements. Bankers decide their (unobservable) exposure to systemic shocks by trading off risk-shifting gains with the value of preserving their capital after a systemic shock. Capital requirements reduce credit and output in
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9134.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-09-30 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-09-30 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2012-09-30 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2012-09-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-RMG-2012-09-30 (Risk Management)
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