Who Needs the Nation State?
AbstractThe design of institutions is shaped by a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand, relationships and heterogeneity push governance down. On the other, the scale and scope benefits of market integration push governance up. A corner solution is rarely optimal. An intermediate outcome, a world divided into diverse polities, is the best that we can do.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9040.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
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- F0 - International Economics - - General
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- Axel Dreher & Kai Gehring & Christos Kotsogiannis & Silvia Marchesi, 2013.
"Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence,"
253, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2013.
- Axel Dreher & Kai Gehring & Christos Kotsogiannis & Silvia Marchesi, 2013. "Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4400, CESifo Group Munich.
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