On the optimal supply of liquidity with borrowing constraints
AbstractWe characterize policies for the supply of liquidity in an economy where agents have a precautionary savings motive due to random production opportunities and the presence of borrowing constraints. We show that a socially efficient provision of liquidity involves a trade-off between insurance and production incentives. Two scenarios are studied: if no aggregate information is available to the policy maker, constant flat expansions are socially beneficial if unproductive spells are sufficiently long. If some aggregate information is available, a socially beneficial state-dependent policy prescribes expanding the supply of liquidity in recessions and contracting it in expansions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8890.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-03-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2012-03-28 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2012-03-28 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2012-03-28 (Monetary Economics)
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