Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky
AbstractInspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this paper provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the common good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. We highlight the importance of institutional design and varying decision weights for the enlargement of the space for consensus. Our model deepens the discussion of economic risk and political risk in fiscal federalism, and highlights the related roles of country heterogeneity and institutional design in enlarging the scope for cross country fiscal agreements.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8552.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-09-05 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2011-09-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Celentani, Marco & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Desmet, Klaus, 2003.
"Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, 2004. "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(3), pages 758-787, July.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, . "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing," Working Papers 2003-08, FEDEA.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde & Klaus Desmet, 2002. "Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing," Economics Working Papers 593, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2003.
- Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2010.
"Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2010/14, European University Institute.
- Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-75, February.
- Eerola, Essi & Määttänen, Niku & Poutvaara, Panu, 2004.
"Citizens Should Vote on Secession,"
939, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.