Terrorism Networks and Trade: Does the Neighbor Hurt?
AbstractIn this paper, we study the impact of transnational terrorism diffusion on security and trade. We set up a simple theoretical model predicting that the closer a country is to a source of terrorism, the higher the negative spillovers on its trade. The idea is that security measures, which impede trade, are directed both against the source country of terror and its neighbor countries where terrorism may diffuse. In contrast, we demonstrate that countries located far rom terror could benefit from an increase in security by trading more. Taken to the test, we empirically document these predictions. We find (1) a direct negative impact of transnational terrorism on trade; (2) an indirect negative impact emanating from terrorism of neighbor countries; and (3) that trade is increasing with remoteness to terror. These results are robust to various definitions of the neighboring relationships among countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7946.
Date of creation: Aug 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- José de Sousa & Daniel Mirza & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "Terrorism Networks and Trade: Does the Neighor Hurt?," Working Papers 2010-04, CEPII research center.
- De Sousa, José & Mirza, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry, 2010. "Terrorism Networks and Trade: Does the Neighbor Hurt?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1017, CEPREMAP.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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