The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets
AbstractLDCs hoped that the DOHA round would bring them greater market access in OECD countries than for non-LDCs. Using HS-6 tariff level data for the US and the EU for 2004, this paper estimates that, once the erosion from preferential access into the EU to non-LDCs is taken into account, LDCs have about a 3% preferential margin in the EU market. In the US market, in spite of preferences under AGOA, on a trade-weighted basis, LDCs are discriminated against. Under various “Swiss formulas” for tariff cuts, effective market access for LDCs in the EU will be negligible and still negative in the US. If the US were to apply a 97% rule (i.e. duty-free, quota-free access for all but three percent of the tariff lines), LDCs could increase exports by 10% or about $1billion annually. Effective market access is further reduced by complicated Rules of Origin (RoO) applied by the EU and the US. Furthermore, generally, the most restrictive RoO fall on products in which LDCs have the greatest preferential market access.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7313.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Other versions of this item:
- Céline Carrere & Jaime Melo De, 2011. "The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets," Working Papers halshs-00554311, HAL.
- Jaime MELO DE & Céline CARRERE, 2009. "The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets," Working Papers 200911, CERDI.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
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