The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War
AbstractThis paper uses a country-level panel dataset to test the hypothesis that the United States biases its human rights reports of countries based on the latters’ strategic value. We use the difference between the U.S. State Department’s and Amnesty International’s reports as a measure of U.S. "bias". For plausibly exogenous variation in strategic value to the U.S., we compare this bias between U.S. Cold War (CW) allies to non-CW allies, before and after the CW ended. The results show that allying with the U.S. during the CW significantly improves reports on a country’s human rights situation from the U.S. State Department relative to Amnesty International.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7026.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Nancy Qian & David Yanagizawa, 2009. "The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from The Cold War," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 446-457, 04-05.
- F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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- Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
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