Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation
AbstractThis paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. We exploit the observed pattern of contributions - the 'revealed preference' of developers - to infer the underlying incentives. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify developers into distinct groups and study how contributions from each developer type vary by license (contract) type and other project characteristics. The central empirical finding is that developers strongly sort by license type, project size and corporate sponsorship. This evidence confirms the importance of heterogeneous motivations, specifically a key role for motivated agents and reputation, but less for reciprocity.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7012.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schankerman, 2008. "Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation," CEP Discussion Papers dp0893, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schankerman, 2008. "Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 47, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-ICT-2009-02-28 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-INO-2009-02-28 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-02-28 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-PPM-2009-02-28 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-SOC-2009-02-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matthias Walther, 2010. "Corruption in Open-Source Software Organisations: A Theoretical Framework," Working Papers halshs-00690332, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.