Sophistication in Risk Management, Bank Equity, and Stability
AbstractWe investigate the question of whether sophistication in risk management fosters banking stability. We compare a simple banking system in which an average rating is used with a sophisticated banking system in which banks are able to assess the default risk of entrepreneurs individually. Both banking systems compete for deposits, loans, and bank equity. While a sophisticated system rewards entrepreneurs with low default risks by low loan interest rates, a simple system acquires more bank equity and finances more entrepreneurs. Expected repayments in a simple system are always higher and its default risk is lower if productivity is sufficiently high. Expected aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs, however, is higher in a sophisticated banking system.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6353.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- Jan Wenzelburger & Hans Gersbach, 2007. "Sophistication in Risk Management, Bank Equity, and Stability," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2007/08, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-06-30 (Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2007-06-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2007-06-30 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2007-06-30 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Elsinger, Helmut & Lehar, Alfred & Summer, Martin, 2005.
"Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment,"
817, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Helmut Elsinger & Alfred Lehar & Martin Summer, 2006. "Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(1), March.
- Bhattacharya, S. & Boot, A.W.A. & Thakor, A.V., 1995.
"The Economics of Bank Regulation,"
9516, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil Ibraheem, 1995. "Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1195-1224, September.
- Guenter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2005.
"Default Risk Sharing Between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations,"
NBER Working Papers
11741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gunter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2007. "Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations," NBER Chapters, in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 603-634 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2005. "Default risk sharing between banks and markets: The contribution of collateralized debt obligations," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/06, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Günter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2005. "Default risk sharing between banks and markets: the contribution of collateralized debt obligations," CoFE Discussion Paper 05-04, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
- Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
- Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune, 2001. "Screening Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 2915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Harald Uhlig, 1996.
"A law of large numbers for large economies (*),"
Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 41-50.
- Gersbach, Hans & Wenzelburger, Jan, 2005.
"Do Risk Premia Protect from Banking Crises?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gersbach, Hans & Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "Debt contracts and collapse as competition phenomena," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 556-574, October.
- Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
- repec:cfs:cfswop:wp200506 is not listed on IDEAS
- Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Weber, Martin, 2001. "Generally accepted rating principles: A primer," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 3-23, January.
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.