Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour
AbstractThis chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6349.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-06-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-06-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-30 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-06-30 (Regulation)
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