Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Power in the Multinational Corporation in Industry Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Marin, Dalia
  • Verdier, Thierry

Abstract

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate our outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focus instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given most autonomy in their decision how to run the firm at intermediate levels of local competition. We then provide comparative statistics for changes in fixed FDI entry costs and trade costs, information technology, the number of local competitors, and in the size of the local market.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6341.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6341.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6341

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: foreign direct investment; international organization of production; power allocation in the firm;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2008. "Power inside the firm and the market: A general equilibrium approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19255, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Dalia Marin & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Globalization and the "New Entreprise"," DELTA Working Papers 2003-31, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  5. Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2003. "Global Sourcing," NBER Working Papers 10082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Puga, Diego & Trefler, Daniel, 2005. "Wake Up and Smell the Ginseng: The Rise of Incremental Innovation in Low-Wage Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5286, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Marin, Dalia, 2006. "A New International Division of Labour in Europe: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 5447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  9. Marc J. Melitz & Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, 2008. "Market Size, Trade, and Productivity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 295-316.
  10. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban & Garicano, Luis & Antras, Pol, 2006. "Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy," Scholarly Articles 3196323, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Gene M. Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006. "Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring," NBER Working Papers 12721, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Alessandro Turrini, 2002. "Distance and FDI when Contracts are Incomplete," Development Working Papers 165, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  15. Claudio Campanale & Rui Castro & Gian Luca Clementi, 2007. "Asset Pricing in a Production Economy with Chew-Dekel Preferences," Working Papers 07-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  16. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2007. "Competing in Organizations: Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 6342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. repec:hrv:faseco:4784031 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Antràs, Pol, 2011. "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production," CEPR Discussion Papers 8598, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kohei Daido & Ken Tabata, 2012. "Skill-Biased Technological Change, Organizational Change, and Wage Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 84, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Feb 2012.
  3. Pol Antràs & Stephen R.Yeaple, 2013. "Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 18775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Marin, Dalia, 2012. "The Theory of the Firm goes Global," CEPR Discussion Papers 8880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Carlo Altomonte & Armando Rungi, 2013. "Business Groups as Hierarchies of Firms: Determinants of Vertical Integration and Performance," Working Papers 2013.33, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Fernandes, Ana P. & Tang, Heiwai, 2012. "Determinants of vertical integration in export processing: Theory and evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 396-414.
  7. Antras, Pol, 2014. "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production," Scholarly Articles 12220386, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Giovanni Facchini & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Symposium on organization, heterogeneity and trade," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 433-436, March.
  9. Zhou, Jun, 2012. "Cartel Duration and Endogenous Private Monitoring and Communication: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 369, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6341. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.