Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to better understand the impact of unemployment on the design of Pay-As-You-Go pension systems, in the context of population aging. We consider a model in which people differ according to age and face in every period a given probability of becoming unemployed. We first determine the optimal pension system, which consists in a payroll tax rate, a pension benefit level and a retirement age and study its comparative statics with respect to a change of the unemployment rate and the length of life. We then characterize the issue-by-issue voting equilibrium and compare it to the optimal pension scheme. It is shown that the median voter in general chooses a retirement age lower than the optimal one as well as a higher payroll tax rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6263.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2007-04-28 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2007-04-28 (Public Economics)
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