IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6162.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?

Author

Listed:
  • Cabral, Luis
  • Ross, Thomas

Abstract

The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry - if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents. The net effect may imply that entry is more profitable when sunk costs are greater.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabral, Luis & Ross, Thomas, 2007. "Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP6162
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August.
    2. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    4. T.W. Ross, 2004. "Sunk Costs and the Entry Decision," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 79-93, June.
    5. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1997. "The Learning Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-169, June.
    6. Luís M. B. Cabral & Michael H. Riordan, 1997. "The Learning Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-169, June.
    7. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    8. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1996. "Capacity, Entry, and Forward Induction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 660-680, Winter.
    9. Ordover, Janusz A. & Willig, Robert D., 1981. "An Economic Definition of Predatory Product Innovation," Working Papers 81-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    10. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
    11. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, December.
    12. Spulber, Daniel F, 1981. "Capacity, Output, and Sequential Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 503-514, June.
    13. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
    14. John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francesca DI IORIO & Maria Letizia GIORGETTI, 2017. "Entry and Patents: Evidence from the US Cardiovascular Pharmaceutical Sector," Departmental Working Papers 2017-07, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Orea, Luis, 2009. "Legal and political barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a frontier approach," Efficiency Series Papers 2009/03, University of Oviedo, Department of Economics, Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG).
    3. Dannenbaum, Judith & Edinger-Schons, Laura Marie & Rese, Mario & Plötner, Olaf & Wieseke, Jan, 2020. "What Does it Take to Successfully Implement a Hybrid Offering Strategy? A Contingency Perspective," SMR - Journal of Service Management Research, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 4(2-3), pages 100-120.
    4. Cong, Rong-Gang & Caro, Dario & Thomsen, Marianne, 2017. "Is it beneficial to use biogas in the Danish transport sector?–An environmental-economic analysis," MPRA Paper 112291, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bryson, Alex & Dale-Olsen, Harald, 2008. "A tale of two countries: unions, closures and growth in Britain and Norway," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19589, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. F. Di Iorio & M. Letizia Giorgetti, 2020. "Launch of a product and patents: evidence from the US cardiovascular pharmaceutical sector," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(7), pages 789-803, August.
    7. Ioannis Kessides & Li Tang, 2010. "Sunk Costs, Market Contestability, and the Size Distribution of Firms," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(3), pages 215-236, November.
    8. Gianni Amisano & Maria Letizia Giorgetti, 2013. "Entry Into Pharmaceutical Submarkets: A Bayesian Panel Probit Analysis," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 667-701, June.
    9. Maria Letizia GIORGETTI & Maria Luisa MANCUSI, 2016. "Entry and Patenting in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Departmental Working Papers 2016-02, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2020. "Welfare Implications of Sequential Entry with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 103422, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Robert S. Pindyck, 2009. "Sunk Costs and Risk-Based Barriers to Entry," NBER Working Papers 14755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Elliott, Robert & Sun, Puyang & Zhu, Tong, 2019. "Electricity prices and industry switching: Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 567-588.
    13. Orea, Luis, 2009. "Entry efficiency and barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market," Efficiency Series Papers 2009/02, University of Oviedo, Department of Economics, Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG).
    14. Nishant Chadha & Viswanath Pingali & Daniel Sokol, 2023. "Small Businesses and Digital Platforms," IIMA Working Papers WP 2023-09-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    15. Ilkka Leppänen, 2020. "Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 783-799, April.
    16. Pannone, Andrea, 2010. "Production, unemployment and wage flexibility in an ICT-assisted economy: A model," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 219-230, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bayer, Christian, 2007. "Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(9), pages 3069-3109, September.
    2. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2020. "A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 95-120, July.
    3. Arping, Stefan & Diaw, Khaled M., 2008. "Sunk costs, entry deterrence, and financial constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 490-501, March.
    4. Dan Kovenock & Raymond Deneckere & Tom Faith & Beth Allen, 2000. "Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 501-530.
    5. McShane, William, 2023. "Long-run competitive spillovers of the credit crunch," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2023, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    6. Thompson, Peter, 2010. "Learning by Doing," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 429-476, Elsevier.
    7. Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2020. "Welfare Implications of Sequential Entry with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 103422, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Xavier Martinez-Giralt & Barros Pedro Pita, 2005. "Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(5), pages 1-8.
    9. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Aslan, Hadiye & Kumar, Praveen, 2016. "The product market effects of hedge fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 226-248.
    11. Lindsey, Robin & West, Douglas S., 2003. "Predatory pricing in differentiated products retail markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 551-592, April.
    12. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    13. Lu, Yuanzhu & Poddar, Sougata, 2005. "Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 365-374, December.
    14. Pedro Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2005. "Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 191-204, June.
    15. Aggarwal, Rimjhim & Narayan, Tulika A., 2000. "Does Inequality Lead To Greater Efficiency In The Use Of Local Commons? The Role Of Strategic Investments In Capacity," Working Papers 28572, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    16. Marcel Canoy & Patrick Rey & Eric van Damme, 2004. "Dominance and Monopolization," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Rupayan Pal & Vinay Ramani, 2017. "Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 806-819, December.
    18. Dawei (David) Zhang & Barrie R. Nault & Xueqi (David) Wei, 2019. "The Strategic Value of Information Technology in Setting Productive Capacity," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 1124-1144, December.
    19. Philipp Weinschenk, 2009. "Persistence of Monopoly and Research Specialization," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    20. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Barriers to entry; Sunk costs;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.