Heterogeneity of Preferences, Limited Commitment and Coalitions: Empirical Evidence on the Limits to Risk Sharing in Rural Pakistan
AbstractIn this paper, we study the determinants of the value of informal risk sharing groups. In particular, we look at the effects of heterogeneity of preferences and of limited commitment constraints that restrict feasible allocations differently if individuals can deviate form risk sharing agreements in coalitions or not. We test empirically several predictable implications in rural Pakistan taking into account the heterogeneity of households' preferences. Our results show that exogenous size of risk sharing groups can be rejected or that only imperfect risk sharing is obtained within the village because of limited commitment and because of the risk of coalition formation that needs to be deterred.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6004.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- Dubois, P., 2005. "Heterogeneity of preferences, limited commitment and coalitions : empirical evidence on the limits to risk sharing in rural Pakistan," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200505, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
- Dubois, Pierre, 2005. "Heterogeneity of Preferences, Limited Commitment and Coalitions Empirical Evidence on the Limits to Risk Sharing in Rural Pakistan," IDEI Working Papers 391, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- NEP-AGR-2007-01-02 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-01-02 (Development)
- NEP-IAS-2007-01-02 (Insurance Economics)
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- Fabien MOIZEAU & Fernando JARAMILLO & Hubert KEMPF, 2011. "Heterogeneity and the Formation of Risk-Sharing Coalitions," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201111, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Fernando Jaramillo & Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau, 2013. "Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 011013, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Tessa Bold, 2008. "Implications of Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk-Sharing," Economics Series Working Papers 387, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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