Democracy and Protectionism
AbstractDoes democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5698.
Date of creation: May 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- Kevin H. O'Rourke & Alan M. Taylor, 2006. "Democracy and Protectionism," NBER Working Papers 12250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kevin O'Rourke, 2007. "Democracy and Protectionism," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp191, IIIS.
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- N70 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - General, International, or Comparative
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2006-10-28 (International Trade)
- NEP-POL-2006-10-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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