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Does Migration Empower Married Women?

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  • Chen, Natalie
  • Conconi, Paola
  • Perroni, Carlo

Abstract

Differences in gender-based labour market discrimination across countries imply that migration may affect husbands and wives differently. If migrant wives experience a relative improvement in their labour market position, bargaining theory suggests that they should experience comparatively larger gains. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labour market allows more flexibility in their labour supply choices. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for migrant women lead them to bear the double burden of market and household work.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5559.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5559

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Keywords: gender discrimination; international migration; renegotiation;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Valentina Calderón & Margarita Gáfaro & Ana María Ibáñez, 2011. "Forced Migration, Female Labor Force Participation, and Intra-household Bargaining: Does Conflict EmpowerWomen?," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 008912, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.

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