Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyse the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider two kinds of politicians: the benevolent one is interested in promoting social welfare whereas the other one is clientelistic, his only goal being to maximize his chances of being elected. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of the policy (using the utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) in the recipient country ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of marginal consumption, which governs how the sensitivity of voters to a clientelistic allocation of resources (over a socially optimal one) varies with the level of consumption. When the elasticity is low, the probability that the clientelistic politician be elected increases and the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This case of substitution of policy quality by aid can help to explain the poor performance of conditionality in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of the elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid worsens the clientelistic candidate’s election prospects and thus improves the expected policy set.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
5441.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004.
"Vote Buying,"
Discussion Papers
1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005.
"Vote Buying,"
Others
0503006, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005.
"Vote buying,"
Working Papers
1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]