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Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU and Japan

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Author Info
von Hagen, Jürgen

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Abstract

Fiscal rules specify quantitative targets for key budgetary aggregates. In this paper, we review the experience with such rules in Japan and in the EU. Comparing the performance of fiscal policy in the 1980s and 1990s until 2003, we find that the fiscal rule of the 1980s exerted some but not much disciplinary influence on Japanese fiscal policy. The fiscal rule of the Maastricht Treaty had a significant impact on political budget cycles in the EU, but did little to constrain fiscal policy in the large member states. Since the start of the European Monetary Union, the disciplinary effect of the fiscal rule in the EU has vanished. Next, we discuss the importance of budgetary institutions for the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In Europe, a number of countries adopted strong fiscal rules, i.e., a fiscal rule combined with a design of the budget process enabling governments to commit to the rule. We find that strong fiscal rules have been effective. We conclude with some suggestions for the design of a strong fiscal rule in Japan.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5330.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5330

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Related research
Keywords: fiscal policy government budgeting political budget cycles

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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  1. Buti, Marco & Martins, Joao Nogueira & Turrini, Alessandro Antonio, 2006. "From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 5809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Candelon Bertrand & Muysken Joan & Vermeulen Robert, 2007. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe: An Update," Research Memoranda 050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anthony Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe's Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/116, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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