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Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors

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Author Info
Ljungqvist, Alexander P
Marston, Felicia
Starks, Laura T
Wei, Kelsey D.
Yan, Hong

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994-2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure, but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5001.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5001

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Related research
Keywords: analyst forecast accuracy; analyst recommendations; banking relationships; conflicts of interest; institutional investors; investment banking;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
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  15. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2003. "Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 313-351, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Alexander Ljungqvist & Felicia Marston & William J. Wilhelm, 2006. "Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 301-340, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Welch, Ivo, 2000. "Herding among security analysts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 369-396, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hamid Mehran & Rene M. Stulz, 2006. "The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 12695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Simona Mola & Massimo Guidolin, 2006. "Why do analysts continue to provide favorable coverage for seasoned stocks?," Working Papers 2006-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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