Capital Structure under Imperfect Enforcement
AbstractBuilding on a costly state verification framework, we propose a theory of capital structure with imperfect enforcement. In addition to being consistent with stylized facts on the choice of capital structure, it accommodates a range of empirical regularities on the repayment behaviour, such as strategic defaults of debt obligations, costly bankruptcy, investor intervention, and violations of absolute priority rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4757.
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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- NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
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