Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?
Abstract20 countries around the world have used incentive packages, including bonus shares and discounts, to attract retail investors to participate in privatizations. Using a unique dataset, we estimate the total cost of incentive packages at approximately $27 billion. The expiration of bonus share plans is associated with a six-day abnormal return of -1.1% and a long-term increase in volume. Incentives have been surprisingly effective in meeting stated privatization objectives. A dollar spent on retail incentives helps to attract about 21 times as many investors as a dollar spent on underpricing. Individual-level analysis shows that flipping is not only much reduced in the short term, but also declines by at least 15% over a period of 1,000 trading days.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4612.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kaustia, Markku & Knüpfer, Samuli, 2012. "Peer performance and stock market entry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 321-338.
- Bortolotti, Bernardo & de Jong, Frank & Nicodano, Giovanna & Schindele, Ibolya, 2004.
"Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4449, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lulu Gu & W. Robert Reed, 2012.
"Information Asymmetry, Market Segmentation and Cross-Listing: Implicatons for Event Study Methodology,"
Working Papers in Economics
12/08, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Gu, Lulu & Reed, W. Robert, 2013. "Information asymmetry, market segmentation, and cross-listing: Implications for event study methodology," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 28-40.
- Guedhami, Omrane & Pittman, Jeffrey A. & Saffar, Walid, 2009. "Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 151-171, December.
- Lulu Gu & W. Robert Reed, 2011. "One For All or All For One? Using Multiple-listing Information in Event Studies," Working Papers in Economics 11/33, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.