AbstractAcid rain is caused by sulphur dioxide (SO2), largely from power stations, and nitrogen oxides (NOx), half of which comes from vehicles. The paper attempts to quantify the costs and benefits of abatement in Europe, and concludes that the current agreement on uniform reductions from 1980 levels is inefficient and costly. The evidence suggests that SO2 pollution from power stations is costly and should be reduced. The damage done by different polluters varies significantly with location, as does the cost of abatement. A better solution is payment for reductions from benchmark levels, but tradable permits give rise to problems within the privatized but duopolized electricity-generating industry in the United Kingdom. The emphasis on reducing NOx emissions from vehicles seems misplaced and costly. For both pollutants the present state of knowledge about the costs of the damage done is poor and is a major impediment to rational policy making.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 442.
Date of creation: Aug 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
You can help add them by filling out this form.
RePEc Biblio mentionsAs found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
- > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Environmental Economics > Economics of acidification
- Barrett, Alan & Lawlor, John, 1995. "The Economics of Solid Waste Management in Ireland," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number PRS26.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997.
"Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
- Halkos, George, 2000. "Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices?," MPRA Paper 42849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nagase, Yoko & Silva, Emilson C.D., 2007. "Acid rain in China and Japan: A game-theoretic analysis," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 100-120, January.
- Labandeira-Villot, Xavier, 1996. "Market instruments and the control of acid rain damage : Effects of a sulphur tax on the Spanish electricity generating industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 841-854, September.
- Antoine Soubeyran & Ngo Van Long, 2000. "Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 83-89.
- Hutton, J P & Halkos, G E, 1995. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy for Europe: An analysis for the year 2000," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 259-275, October.
- Halkos, George, 2013. "Uncertainty in optimal pollution levels: Modeling the benefit area," MPRA Paper 47768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hawdon, David & Pearson, Peter, 1995. "Input-output simulations of energy, environment, economy interactions in the UK," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 73-86, January.
- Dragone, Davide & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014.
"Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game,"
Strategic Behavior and the Environment,
now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 15-40, April.
- D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2011. "Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game," Working Papers wp738, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Nagase, Yoko & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Optimal Control of Acid Rain in a Federation with Decentralized Leadership and Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 164-180, September.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00195593 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.