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Acid Rain

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Author Info
Newbery, David M G

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Abstract

Acid rain is caused by sulphur dioxide (SO2), largely from power stations, and nitrogen oxides (NOx), half of which comes from vehicles. The paper attempts to quantify the costs and benefits of abatement in Europe, and concludes that the current agreement on uniform reductions from 1980 levels is inefficient and costly. The evidence suggests that SO2 pollution from power stations is costly and should be reduced. The damage done by different polluters varies significantly with location, as does the cost of abatement. A better solution is payment for reductions from benchmark levels, but tradable permits give rise to problems within the privatized but duopolized electricity-generating industry in the United Kingdom. The emphasis on reducing NOx emissions from vehicles seems misplaced and costly. For both pollutants the present state of knowledge about the costs of the damage done is poor and is a major impediment to rational policy making.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 442.

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Date of creation: Aug 1990
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:442

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Related research
Keywords: Acid Rain; Bargaining; Cost-benefit; International Agreement; Pollution;

Cited by:
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  1. Karl-Göran Mäler & Aart De Zeeuw, 1998. "The Acid Rain Differential Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Aidt, T.S., 2000. "The Rise of Environmentalism, Pollution Taxes and Intra-Industry Trade," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0017, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani & E. Scorcu, 2007. "Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach. ," Working Papers 615, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1991. "An analysis of SO2 negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 104-112, Autumn. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Collusive Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-31, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen W. Salant & Greg Shaffer, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997. "Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-21, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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