Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

India's Trade Policy For Sale: How Much? Who Buys?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cadot, Olivier
  • Grether, Jean-Marie
  • Olarreaga, Marcelo

Abstract

This Paper proposes a new method to test the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection and lobby formation. This method, which does not require outside data on lobbies or contributions, identifies politically organized industries for trade protection purposes and calculates equilibrium contributions directly from the model using structural parameter estimates. Its emphasis on vertical inter-industry linkages makes it also possible to trace the effects of duty drawbacks and counter-lobbying from downstream users on endogenous protection. Applied to India, it yields results that are qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions and that seem quantitatively more plausible than estimates given for the US by alternative methods. The weight on social welfare in the government’s objective function is 5, and the average contribution per ISIC sector is $33 million.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4168.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4168.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4168

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: India; political economy; protection;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Puja Vasudeva Dutta, 2007. "Trade Protection and Inter-Industry Wages in India," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(2), pages 268-286, January.
  2. Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4168. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.