Bottled Water - A Case of Pointless Trade?
AbstractTwo-way trade in (almost) homogenous products has ambiguous welfare effects if entry is restricted. We examine Swedish imports of bottled water to investigate whether transport cost losses from trade outweigh the partial equilibrium gains from trade (stronger competition and more brands to choose from). Using monthly data for all brands sold in stores during 1998-2001 we estimate a structural model of demand. Assuming one-shot Bertrand competition by multibrand firms, we can use the estimated model to uncover marginal costs. We simulate the effect on consumer and producer surplus of banning imports, finding that banning imports would decrease overall welfare. Expanded choice is the main benefit of trade and disregarding this the net welfare effect of imports in this market are approximately zero - the pro-competitive effect is of the same size as the cost savings associated with replacing foreign, higher cost, suppliers with domestic. Given our choice of market this suggests we should not be overly concerned with the welfare effects of two-way trade in consumer goods that are close to homogenous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4145.
Date of creation: Dec 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
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- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2009.
"Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance,"
IDEI Working Papers
583, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Céline Bonnet & Pierre Dubois, 2010. "Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 139-164.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2008. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," CEPR Discussion Papers 6918, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2008. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," IDEI Working Papers 519, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Dec 2008.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2009. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," TSE Working Papers 09-040, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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