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Working-Time Regulation, Firm Heterogeneity, and Efficiency

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  • Ortega, Javier

Abstract

A labour-matching economy with ex post heterogeneous firms is presented. When bargaining over the wage, firms and workers do not know the level of product demand. Once demand is realized, hours of work are chosen. We show that the existence of a legal workweek may enhance efficiency with respect to laissez-faire: while laissez-faire is good at allocating hours across firms, regulation may be better at reproducing optimal hours. Shortening the legal workweek raises employment and is Pareto-improving if and only if the demand faced by low-demand firms and/or the overtime premium are small enough.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3736.

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Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3736

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Related research

Keywords: efficiency; unemployment; work-sharing; working-time;

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Cited by:
  1. Stéphane Auray & Samuel Danthine, 2009. "Bargaining Frictions, Labor Income Taxation, and Economic Performance," Cahiers de recherche 09-20, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
  2. Schreiber, Sven, 2008. "Did work-sharing work in France? Evidence from a structural co-integrated VAR model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 478-490, June.
  3. Díaz, Antonia & Echevarria, Cristina, 2009. "Why a fixed workweek?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 790-798, October.
  4. Camille Logeay & Sven Schreiber, 2005. "Testing the effectiveness of the French work-sharing reform: a forecasting approach," IMK Working Paper 03-2005, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.

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