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Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

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  • Battaglini, Marco
  • Bénabou, Roland

Abstract

We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have private but imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy maker. When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is shown to be equivalent to that with a single lobbyist, and even though activism conveys valuable information, it always reduces social welfare. When interest groups act independently, two main scenarios arise. In a ‘bandwagon’ or low-trust equilibrium, agents have a high propensity to lobby even when it is unwarranted, and conversely the policy maker does not react unless all of them are actively lobbying. In a ‘mutual discipline’ or high-trust equilibrium, by contrast, each agent’s behaviour is more informative, and the policy maker’s response threshold correspondingly lower. The key difference is whether the event in which an agent can expect to be pivotal is one where others will be providing supporting evidence by their own activity (thus allowing him to be less truthful), or contrary evidence by their inactivity (thus forcing him to be more credible). We show that when the expected degree of conflict between the lobbyists and the policy maker is relatively high the unique equilibrium is of the ‘mutual discipline’ type; when ideological distance is relatively low, it is of the ‘bandwagon’ type; within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We also examine the welfare implications of the different equilibria and study the optimal organization of influence activities, examining when the policy maker and the activists would prefer that the latter coordinate their actions, or act separately.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3611.

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Date of creation: Oct 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3611

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Keywords: activism; interest groups; lobbying; political economy; signalling games;

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References

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  1. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9902003, EconWPA.
  3. Figueiredo John M. de, 2002. "Lobbying and Information in Politics," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-6, August.
  4. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F. van, 1992. "Lobbying and asymmetric information," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-223989, Tilburg University.
  6. repec:fth:prinin:460 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
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